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THE CASE FOR RULES IN THE CONDUCT OF 
MONETARY POLICY: A CONCRETE EXAMPLE 
Introduction 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  a 
nontechnical  but  reasonably  up-to-date  description 
of the  case  for rules,  as opposed  to discretion,  in the 
conduct  of monetary  and fiscal policy.  Special  atten- 
tion  will  be  paid  to  the  current  state  of  macro- 
economic  theory  and to the  experiences  of developed 
economies  in the  postwar  (i.e.,  post-World  War  II) 
era. A feature  of the  paper  is the proposal  of a specific 
rule  for monetary  policy,  one  that  is not  open  to ob- 
jections  typically  made  by  opponents  of rules.  Some 
evidence  regarding  the  potential  effectiveness  of this 
particular  rule  is reported. 
Basic Considerations 
The  first thing  that  needs  to be emphasized  is that 
the  issue  of  rules  vs.  discretion  is not  the  same  as 
the  issue  of  activist  vs.  nonactivist  policy.  That  a 
policy  rule  can  be  activist-i.e.,  can  be  one  that  ad- 
justs  the  value  of a policy  instrument  in response  to 
prevailing  economic  conditions-is  a  sufficiently 
elementary  point  that  it has  been  clearly  expressed 
in the  widely  used  undergraduate  macroeconomics 
textbook  of Dornbusch  and Fischer  (1984)  for almost 
a decade.’  Yet it needs  to be  emphasized,  as leading 
economists2  and  policymakers  continue  to  argue 
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in a fashion  that  muddles  together  the  two  distinct 
issues,  and sometimes  even  proceeds  as if rules  could 
be  discredited  in general  by  listing  disadvantages  of 
a particular  type  of rule that  calls for a constant  growth 
rate  of  the  money  stock. 
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Richmond. 
This  paper  was  originally  prepared  for  the  Kiel  Conference 
of Iune  1987.  “Macro  and  Micro  Policies  for More  Growth  and 
Employment:”  The  author  is indebted  to Allan Mekzer  for helpful 
suggestions  and  to  Robert  J.  Gordon  for  constructive  criticism. 
1 The  example  provided  by  Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1984, 
pp.  342-43)  is  a policy  rule  that  sets  the  money-stock  growth 
rate  equal  to  4.0  +  Z(u-5.0),  where  u  is  a recent  unemploy- 
ment  rate.  Both  u and the  (annualized)  money-stock  growth  rate 
are  here  measured  in  percentage  points. 
What  then  is the  nature  of the  rules  vs.  discretion 
distinction?  It  is  I  think  widely  agreed  among 
macroeconomic  researchers  that  the  crucial  distinc- 
tion  is  the  one  illustrated  in  the  seminal  paper  of 
Kydland  and  Prescott  (1977)4  and  elaborated  upon 
by  Barro  and  Gordon  (1983a).  But precisely  how  to 
characterize  this  distinction  is  not  so  clear.  Many 
economists  use  the  term  “precommitment”  to 
describe  policymaking  by rules,s  and  often  continue 
by discussing  the  difficulty  or impossibility  of achiev- 
ing binding  precommitment.  Now  in the  context  of 
monetary  and fiscal policy,  it would  appear  that  literal 
and  full  precommitment  is  in  fact  virtually  impos- 
sible.  But it is not  impossible  for a monetary  authority 
to select  policy  actions  that  conform  to the  “rule” se- 
quence  in the  Kydland-Prescott  example,  so it must 
be  concluded  that  precommitment  cannot  be  the 
crucial  characteristic.  Instead,  policymaking  accord- 
ing  to  a rule  exists  when  the  policymaker  chooses 
not  to  attempt  optimizing  choices  on  a period-by- 
period  (or case-by-case)  basis,  but  chooses  rather  to 
implement  in each  period  (or  case)  a formula  for  sel:- 
ting  his  instrument  that  has  been  designed  to  apply 
to  periods  (cases)  in general,  not  just  the  one  cur- 
rently  at hand.  Thus  the  policymaker’s  efforts  toward 
optimization  enter  in the  design of the  formula to  be 
utilized  in a large  number  of periods,  not  in the  ac- 
tions  selected  in  each  period.6 
2 Tobin  (1983)  recognizes  the  analytical  validity  of the  distinc- 
tion,  but  refuses  to  accept  it  as  a practical  matter. 
3  See,  for  example,  Volcker  (1983). 
4 Which  constitutes  an application  to  macroeconomic  policy  of 
a point  developed  previously  by  Kydland  (1975). 
5  Examples  are  Barro  and  Gordon  (1983b)  and  Grossman  and 
Van  Huyck  (1986). 
6 This  characterization  is consistent  with  Friedman’s  (1962,  pp. 
‘239-41) analogy  to the  constitutional  protection  of free  speech. 
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to  begin  our  analysis  of the  adeanfage  of  rules  over 
discretion  in the  context  of monetary  policy,  let  us 
briefly  review  the  basic  model  laid  out  by  Kydland 
and  Prescott  (1977).  In  this  setup,  the  monetary 
authority’s  objectives  are represented  by a loss func- 
tion  in which  the  arguments  are  the  squared  devia- 
tions  of  unemployment  and  inflation  from  values 
determined  by  considerations  of  allocational  effi- 
ciency.’  It will simplify  matters  without  distortion  of 
the  argument,  however,  to simply  take  the  loss func- 
tion  to  LL decreasing  in the  current  money-growth 
sz~$rise (since  unanticipated  money  growth  reduces 
unemployment)  and  increasing  in  the  square  of 
money  growth  itself  (since  money  growth  induces 
inflation) .8 There  are also discounted  values  of similar 
terms  for all future  periods,  but  for present  purposes 
these  can  be  ignored.  If,  with  this  objective  func- 
tion,  the  monetary  authority  were  to  adopt  a policy 
m~2  by choosing  among  constant  money  growth  rates, 
he  would  recognize  that  with  moderately  rational 
agents  the  surprise  values  will  average  to  zero 
whatever,his  choice;  thus  the  chosen  money  growth 
rate  would  be  zero.  For  the  same  reason,  moreover, 
an avwoge  growth  rate  of zero  would  be  implied  by 
the  optimal  choice  of a (possibly  activist)  rule  when 
a  broader  class  of  rules  is  considered. 
But  suppose  that,  instead,  the  authority  executes 
policy  in a period-by-period  or discretionary  manner, 
i.e.,  by  selecting  each  period’s  money  growth  rate 
on the  basis of a fresh  optimization  calculation.  Then 
in each  period  the  prevailing  expected money  growth 
rate  is  taken  by  the  authority  as  a  given  piece  of 
’  Our  conclusions  will  depend  upon  the  plausible  assumption 
that  deviations  of  inflation  from  the  optimal  rate  are  increas- 
ingly  costly  at  the  margin;  use  of the  squared  deviation  reflects 
th%.requirement  in a tractable  manner.  The  unemployment  term 
is of  the  form  (u,  -  k U.)r.  with  5,  the  natural-rate  value  of  LL 
and  with  k <  1. The  latter  condition  expresses  the  assumption 
that  the  monetary  authority’s  target  value  for  II, is  below  the 
natural  rate.  Barro  and  Gordon  (1983a)  interoret  this  as reflec- 
ting  some  externality  and  consdquendy  claim  that  there  is  no 
discrepancy  between  the  policymaker’s  objectives  and  private 
agents’  preferences.  The  analysis  would  remain  the  same, 
however,  if the  k <  1 condition  were  interpreted  as merely  reflec- 
ting  a desire  by  the  policymaker  for  an  excessively  low  rate  of 
unemployment.  Indeed,  all  that  is  necessary  is  that  the 
policymaker  values  marginal  reductions  of unemployment  in the 
vicinity  of  its  natural-rate  value. 
8 In the  cited  literature,  “money  growth”  and “inflation” are often 
used  interchangeably.  In  my  opinion,  it  is  preferable  to  think 
in  terms  of  money  growth  as  unemployment  is  in  fact  more 
closely  related  to  money  than  price  level  surprises.  In addition, 
inflation  actually  responds  to  money  growth  only  slowly,  so cur- 
rent  money  growth  affects  expectations  of  future  inflation. 
Recognition  of this  point  overturns  the  argument  of Grossman 
and  Van  Huyck  (1986)  to  the  effect  that  the  Kydland-Prescott 
setup  is  misspecified. 
data-a  new “initial condition.”  The  current  surprise 
then  appears  to  the  authority  to  be  under  his  con- 
trol,  so  the  loss-minimizing  choice  of  the  current 
money  growth  rate  is that  value  which  just  equates 
the  marginal  benefit  of surprise  money  growth  to the 
marginal  cost  of money  growth  per se. With  the  ob- 
jective  function  as described,  this  seemingly  optimal 
value  will clearly  be  positive.  But  since  moderately 
rational  private  agents  will come  to  understand  this 
process,  their  expectations  regarding  money  growth 
will  be  correct  on  average.  Thus  the  surprise 
magnitude  will  be  zero  on  average,  over  any  large 
number  of periods,  even  though  the  magnitude  within 
each  period  is  under  the  control  of  the  monetary 
authority.  Consequently,  there  will on average  be no 
benefit-no  extra  employment-materializing  from 
surprises.  On  average,  then,  the  discretionary  regime 
will feature  more  money  growth  (i.e.,  inflation)  but 
the  same  amount  of  surprise  money  growth  (i.e., 
unemployment)  as with  a well-designed  rule  based 
on  the  same  objectives.  Thus  the  objectives  will be 
more  fully  achieved  with  the  adoption  of a rule  than 
with  period-by-period  attempts  at  optimization. 
It should  be  noted  that  the  foregoing  line  of argu- 
ment  does  not  require  that  the  economy  actually  be 
one  in which  monetary  surprises  induce  temporary 
output  and  employment  gains.  Nor  is it  necessary 
that  private  sector  expectations  are  fully  rational. 
What  is  required  is  that  the  monetary  authority 
be&ewes  that  unusually  rapid  monetary  growth  will in- 
duce  output/employment  gains and  that  expectations 
are  rational  enough  to  avoid  any  permanent  bias. 
Also,  the  economy  must  be  one  that  satisfies  the 
weak  version  of the  natural-rate  hypothesis:  output 
and  employment  must  be  independent  over  long 
spans of time  of the  economy’s  average  inflation  rate.9 
To  this point  it has been  argued  that  the  conscien- 
tious  attempt  to avoid  both  inflation  and  unemploy- 
ment  will lead  to an excessive  amount  of the  former, 
with no reduction  in the  latter,  when  monetary  policy 
is conducted  in a discretionary  manner.  Is there  any 
empirical  evidence  to  suggest  that  this  theoretical 
proposition  is in fact  descriptive  of the  workings  of 
actual  central  banks  and  actual  economies? 
To  my mind,  the  most  impressive  evidence  in this 
regard  comes  from  straightforward  examination  of the 
postwar  inflationary  experience  of the  industrialized 
nations  of Europe  and  North  America.  Specifically, 
price  levels  are now  in all these  nations  several  times 
as high  as they  were  in  1950.  Even  in Germany  the 
9  For  additional  discussion  of  related  issues,  including  reputa- 
tional  models,  see  McCallum  (1987).  Alternative  surveys  are 
provided  by  Barro  (1986)  and  Cukierman  (1986). 
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1950  level,  while  the  comparable  magnitude  is less 
than  one-tenth  for  France,  Italy,  and  the  United 
Kingdom.  (A few  figures  are  reported  in  Table  I.) 
While  there  have  been  no episodes  of extremely  rapid 
inflation,  price  levels  have  risen  steadily  and substan- 
tially.  The  relevant  question  is,  therefore,  why  has 
the  experience  been  one  ofpositive inflation  in most 
years  in  all  of  these  countries?  The  populations, 
governments,  and  central  banks  of these  nations  do 
not  enjoy  inflation-indeed,  they  regard  it  as 
something  absolutely  undesirable  on  its own.  Also, 
there  is little  reason  to believe  that  the  policymakers 
in these  nations  are  of the  opinion  that  there  is any 
permanent stimulative  effect  on  employment  or  out- 
put  of  positive  inflation  rates.  They  know  that 
employment  and  output  growth  were  not  enhanced 
by the  inflation  and rapid money  growth  of the  1970s. 
So why  have  price  levels  not  moved  downward  about 
as often  as upward,  leaving  current  prices  about  the 
same  as  in  1950? 
My  suggestion,  of course,  is that  the  Barro-Gordon 
theoryi  provides  an  answer  to  these  questions, 
namely,  that  discretionary  policymaking  has been  ex- 
ercised  in  the  postwar  era  by  central  bankers  who 
wish  to  avoid  inflation  but  who  also  have  employ- 
ment  or  output  concerns.  The  plausibility  of  this 
suggestion  is enhanced,  I believe,  by  a comparison 
of  the  postwar  experience  with  that  of an earlier  era 
in  which  monetary  policy  was  circumscribed  by 
-formal  rules.  Here  the  reference  is, of course,  to the 
period  before  World  War  I when  the  countries  under 
discussion  maintained  commodity-money  standards. 
As all readers  probably  know,  price  levels  at the  start 
of World  War  I were  roughly  the  same  as they  had 
been  in  the  middle  1800s-or  in  the  late  17OOs, 
before  the  start  of  the  Napoleonic  Wars.  For  easy 
reference,  a few  relevant  figures  are  reproduced  in 
Table  II. 
A  Specific Rule for Monetary  Policy 
Instead  of  continuing  the  discussion  of  rules  vs. 
discretion  in the  abstract,  let us now  turn  to the  con- 
sideration  of  a  specific  rule  for  the  conduct  of 
monetary  policy.  Examination  of a concrete  proposal 
should  help  to  reveal  weaknesses  in the  rule-based 
approach,  if they  exist,  or  to  attract  support  for  the 
rule,  if  its  desirable  properties  are  convincingly 
impressive. 
lo  While  the  model  outlined  above  was  developed  by  Kydland 
and  Prescott  (1977),  its use  as apositiwe  theory  of policy  behavior 
was  pioneered  by  Barro  and  Gordon  (1983a). 
Table  I 
CONSUMER  PRICE  INDICES,  POST-WORLD  WAR  II 
Nation  CPI,  1950  CPI,  1985 
Belgium  30.1  140.5 
France  15.6  157.9 
Germany  39.2  121.0 
Italy  13.9  190.3 
Netherlands  23.9  122.7 
United  Kingdom  13.4  141.5 
United  States  29.2  130.5 









In previous  writings,  I have  emphasized  four  prin- 
ciples  that  should  be  respected  in  the  design  of  a 
monetary  rule  (McCallum,  1984,  1983,  which  are 
as follows.  First,  the  rule  should  dictate  the  behavior 
of a variable  that  the  monetary  authority  can  control 
directly  and/or  accurately.  To  specify  behavior  of 
some  magnitude  that  is not  itself  controllable-such 
as  the  Ml  measure  of  the  money  stock,  for 
instance-would  be  to  leave  the  task  of rule  design 
seriously  incomplete.  Second,  the  rule should  not rely 
in any  essential  way  upon  the  presumed  absence  of 
regulatory  change  and  technical  progress  in the  finan- 
cial industry.  While  these  processes  may  not produce 
as  much  turmoil  in  the  future  as  they  have  in  the 
recent  past,  it would  be unsafe  to-presume  that  they 
wilI not  be present  again to a significant  extent.  Third, 
neither  money  stock  nor  (nominal)  interest  rate  paths 
Table  II 
WHOLESALE  PRICE  INDICES,  PRE-WORLD  WAR  I 
United 
Year  Belgium  Britain  France  Germany  States 
1776  na  101  na  na  84 
1793  na  120  na  98  100 
1800  na  186  155  135  127 
1825  na  139  126  76  101 
1850  83  91  96  71  82 
1875  100  121  111  100  80 
1900  87  86  85  90  80 
1913  100  100  100  100  100 
Sources:  B.R.  Mitchell,  European  Historical  Statidics;  Bureau  of 
the  Census,  Historical  Statistics  of  the  United  States. 
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relevant  only  to  the  extent  that  they  are  useful  in 
facilitating  good  performance  in terms  of inflation  and 
output  or employment  magnitudes.  Fourth,  a well- 
designed  rule  should  recognize  the  limits  of macro- 
economic  knowledge.  In  particular,  it  should 
recognize  that  neither  theory  nor’ evidence  points 
convincingly  to  any  of  the  numerous  competing 
models  of  the  interaction  of  nominal  and  real 
variables.  The  economics  profession  does  not  have 
a reliable  quantitative  or  even  qualitative  model  of 
aggregate  supply  (or  “Phillips  curve”)  behavior.  In 
other  words,  the  profession  does  not  have  accurate 
knowledge  of the  way  in which  changes  in nominal 
GNP  will be  divided,  on  a quarter-to-quarter  basis, 
between  real  output  growth  and  inflation.”  Thus 
any rule whose  design  depends  upon  some  particular 
model  of that  division  warrants  very  little confidence. 
In one  of these  earlier  papers  (McCallum,  1984), 
I proposed  in qualitative  terms  a rule  that  respects 
all four  of these  principles.  My  proposal  began  with 
the  specification  of  a target  path  for  nominal  GNP 
that  grows  evenly  at a prespecified  rate  that  equals 
the  economy’s  prevailing  long-term  average  rate  of 
real  output  growth.  For  the  United  States  the 
appropriate  figure  is about  3 percent  per  year.  Since 
this  magnitude  will  be  virtually  independent  of 
monetary  policy  over  any  extended  period  (say,  20 
years  or more),  keeping  nominal  GNP  growth  at the 
appropriate  value-henceforth  assumed  to be  3 per- 
cent  per  yearlz-should  yield  approximately  zero 
inflation  over  any  such  period.  Furthermore,  the 
prevention  of  fluctuations  in  nominal  GNP  growth 
should  help  to  prevent  swings  of  real  output  from 
its  trend  path.  l3  While  some  output  fluctuations 
would  continue  to occur  even  with a perfectly  smooth 
growth  path  for  nominal  demand,  they  would  prob- 
ably  be  as small  as can  feasibly  be  obtained,  given 
the  absence  of  a  reliable  Phillips  curve  model. 
*I  On  this  topic  again  see  McCallum  (1987). 
12 Designation  of  the  trend  value  of  real  output  growth  is,  of 
course,  part  of  the  rule’s  specification.  It  should  be  based  on 
the  economy’s  actual  real  growth  record  over  the  past  several 
decades  and  should  be  changed  very  infrequently  -say,  once 
every  ten  years.  Any  error  in setting  this  rate  will obviously  lead 
to an error  of equal  percentage  magnitude  (but  of opposite’  sign) 
in the  inflation  rate  induced  bv  the  rule.  Fortunatelv.  the  con- 
ceivable  magnitude  of such  errors  is quite  small-probably  less 
than  1 percent  per  year-for  developed  economies. 
I3 The  workings  of  the  rule  are  independent  of  the  currently 
prominent  issue  concerning  the  nature  of  output  trends.  Thus 
the  target  path  for  nominal  GNP  should  be  set  to  grow  at  the 
value  y  whether  real  output  growth  occurs  according  to  y,  = 
a!  +  Yt  +  E, or  to  y,-y,-,  =  y  +  .s,. (Here  et denotes  white 
noise.) 
To  complete  the  rule,  an operational  mechanism 
must  be specified  for keeping  (nominal)  GNP  growth 
close  to  the  prespecified  3  percent  growth  path.14 
My  1984  suggestion  was  to  adopt  as an instrument 
the  monetary  base,  a variable  that  can  be  accurately 
set  on  a day-by-day  basis  by the  central  bank  of any 
political  entity  with  a  floating  exchange  rate. 
Specifically,  the  rule  “would  adjust  the  base  growth 
rate  each  month  or  quarter,  increasing  the  rate  if 
nominal  GNP  is  below  its  target  path,  and  vice 
versa”  (McCallum,  1984,  p.  390). 
The  algebraic  form  implicit  in  this  description  is 
as  follows,  where  b,  =  log  of  monetary  base  (for 
period  t), xr  =  log of nominal  GNP,  and x,’ =  target- 
path  value  for  xI: 
(1)  Ab,  =  Ab,-1  +  X,(x:_,  -  x*-l),  x,>o. 
In  this  formula,  the  magnitude  of Xi would  have  to 
be  chosen  so  as  to  (a)  provide  adequate  respon- 
siveness  of base  growth  to  departures  of x, from  its 
target  path  but  (b) without  inducing  dynamic  insta- 
bility  of  the  type  that  can  prevail  when  feedback 
effects  are  too  strong.  Presuming  this  value  is satis- 
factorily  chosen,  one  attractive  feature  of the  scheme 
summarized  in  (1)  is  that  it  would  automatically 
adjust the  b, growth  rate,  in a fashion  that would  yield 
zero  inflation  on  average,  in response  to  alterations 
in base  “velocity”  stemming  from  technical  or regu- 
latory  changes.  Even  in the  face  of drastic  changes 
of this  type  it would  remain  true  that  an increase  in 
Ab, would  be expansionary,  and  a decrease  contrac- 
tionary,  in  terms  of  aggregate  demand-and  more 
knowledge  than  that  is not  required  for  the  appro- 
priate  type  of  adjustment. 
I have  recently  become  persuaded,i5  however,  that 
a  somewhat  different  specification  would  have 
better  properties.  Instead  of (l),  then,  I would  now 
r4  By virtue  of its emphasis  on  this  operational  mechanism,  the 
current  proposal  is  quite  different  from  other  schemes  in- 
volving “nominal  GNP  targeting’  such  as those  of Gordon  (1985), 
Hall  (1983),  and  Taylor  (1985).  This  difference  is  clearly  ex- 
emplified  by  Gordon’s  (1985,  p.  77)  reference  to  “controlling 
growth  in nominal  GNP.  . . ra&rthun  controlling  the  monetary 
base”  (emphasis  added).  Much  of  Gordon’s  discussion,  inci- 
dentally,  is concerned  with  a difficulty  not  elsewhere  discussed 
in the  present  paper,  namely,  that  of starting  up  a rule  like  (2) 
from  initial  conditions  with  nominal  GNP  growth  substantially 
different  from  3 percent.  In this  regard  my own  inclination  would 
be  to begin  with  a path  that  adjusted  gradually  toward  the  3 per- 
cent  figure,  attaining  the  latter  after  (say)  three  years.  Another 
objective  of  Gordon’s  is  to  argue  the  desirability  of final  sales 
over  GNP  as  a nominal  demand  variable;  I have  no  desire  to 
quarrel  with  that  argument. 
I5  In  part  by  discussions  with  Allan  Meltzer. 
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adjustments: 
(2)  Ab,  =  0.00739  -  (l/16)  [x,-i  -  x,-17 
-  b,-,  +  b,+]  +  X,(x:_,  -  x,-l),  X,>O. 
Here  the  constant  term  0.00739  is simply  a 3 per- 
cent  annual  growth  rate  expressed  in  quarterly 
logarithmic  units,  while  the  second  term  subtracts 
from  this the  growth  rate  of base  velocity,  calculated 
as  an  average  over  the  previous  four  years.16 
Finally,  the  thiid  term  adds an adjustment  in response 
to  departures  of GNP  from  its target  path.  Again  the 
only  parameter  value  to be determined  is that  for the 
response  coefficient,  in this  case  denoted  X2. Again 
it  is  possible  to  induce  dynamic  instability  by 
setting  the  value  of X2  too  high.  But  as the  response 
is now  applicable  to  Ab,  rather  than  its change,  Ab, 
-  Ab,+,  the  danger  of instability  is lessened.  My pro- 
posed  value  for  X2 is  0.25,  which  implies  an  extra 
1 percent  base  growth  per  -year for  each  1 percent 
deviation  of  nominal  GNP  from  its  target  path. 
Properties of the Proposed  Rule 
To  determine  how  this rule would  work,  one  needs 
to  experiment  with  it.  Since  experiments  with 
actual  economies  can  be  very  expensive  to  the 
societies  involved,  such  experimentation  needs  to be 
done  with  a model.  The  problem,  of course,  is that 
there  is no  agreement  as to  the  appropriate  model. 
My  conjecture,  however,  is  that  rule  (2)  with 
’  x2  =  0.25  will  perform  well  for  a  wide  variety  of 
quantitative  models  of developed  market  economies 
such  as  the  United  States,  United  Kingdom,  Ger- 
many,  Italy,  France,  or  the  Netherlands.  Let  me 
immediately  be  clear,  however,  about  what  is here 
meant  by  the  term  “perform  well.”  Specifically,  the 
criterion  involves  only  the  time  path  of nominal  GNP; 
as  we  do  not  know  how  changes  in  GNP  will  be 
divided  among  inflation  and  output  growth,  the  rule 
should  not  be  judged  on  the  basis  of  any  particular 
model’s  predictions  in  that  regard.  Subject  to  that 
stipulation,  it is my  conjecture  that  application  of the 
rule  (2) in place  of actual  historical  policy  would  yield 
simulated  nominal  GNP  paths  that  are smoother  than 
those  actually  experienced,i7  as  well  as  implying 
growth  at  noninflationary  rates.  This  type  of result 
16 Note  that  x,+  -  x,-~,  -  b,-,  +  b ,--1, =  :  (Ax,,  -  Abe-J. 
j=l 
17 Here  I am  assuming  simulations  that  feed  in random  errors 
of  the  same  magnitude  as  seem  to  occur  in  actuality;  see  the 
discussion  below. 
will  obtain,  I believe,  whether  the  models  utilized 
are constructed  along Keynesian  or classical lines pro- 
vided  that  they  are not  strongly  inconsistent  with  the 
natural-rate  hypothesis. 
Such  simulations  with  a wide  variety  of  models 
have  yet  to  be  conducted.  But  I can  report  results 
based  on  two  extremely  simple  models  that  are 
merely  atheoretic  regressions  of  nominal  GNP  on 
past values  of itself and values  of the  monetary  base. ** 
The  first such model,  pertaining  to the  U.S.  economy 
for  1954.1-1985.4,  consists  of  the  following  esti- 
mated  regression  equation: 
(3)  Ax,  =  0.00749  +  0.257  Axt-1 
(0.002  1)  (0.079) 
+  0.487  Ab,  +  e, 
(0.121) 
RZ  =  0.23  S  =  0.010  DW  =  2.11 
Here  e,  denotes  the  residual,  i.e.,  the  estimated 
disturbance,  for period  t. Simulated  values  for b, and 
xt  have  been  calculated  for  128  periods  by  means 
of equations  (2)  and  (3),  with  initial  conditions  cor- 
responding  to  1954.1  and with  e, residual  values  fed 
in  each  period  as shock  estimates.  This  procedure 
is analogous  to  one  stochastic  simulation  of (2)  and 
(3) with  shocks  drawn  from  a population  with  mean 
0  and  standard  deviation  0.010. 
Results  of  this  simulation  exercise  are  shown  in 
Chart  1,  where  TAR  denotes  the  target  path  x:. 
Clearly  the  rule  induces  xt to  follow  the  target  path 
quite  closely.  To  put  this  behavior  into  perspective, 
the  result  of this  simulation  is compared  with  simula- 
tions  using alternative  policy  rules  in Table  III. There 
the first numerical  column  reports  root-mean-squared- 
error  (RMSE)  values-i.e.,  square  roots  of the  mean 
over  128  simulated  quarters  of  the  squared  devia- 
tions  of xr from  xJ . The  RMSE  value  of 0.0197  in 
line  1 indicates  that  the  root-mean-squared  deviation 
of nominal  GNP  from  its target  path  is roughly  2.0 
percent  under  rule  (Z),  since  log  deviations  are  ap- 
proximately  equal  to  percentage  deviations  divided 
by  100.  That  figure  can  be  compared  with  a RMSE 
value  of about  22 percent  when  the  policy  rule is one 
that  sets  the  monetary  base  growth  rate  at  zero 
throughout  the  period  (line 3). This  surprisingly  high 
1s Since  drafting  this  paper  I have  also  obtained  results  for  a 
model  that  consists  of a 4-variable  vector  autoregression  (VAR) 
system,  the  variables  being  four lags each  of the  90-day  Treasury 
bill  rate  and  the  logs  of  real  GNP,  the  GNP  deflator,  and  the 
monetary  base.  The  RMSE  value  with  X1 =  0.25  in  rule  (2) 
is  0.0219,  almost  the  same  as  for  model  (4). 




Chart  1 
SIMULATION  RESULTS  FOR  1954  -  1985 
WITH  POLICY  RULE  (2)  AND  MODEL  (3) 
TAR 
6.00.. 
Note:  The  target  path  TAR  increases  by  0.00739  each  quarter,  starting 
from  the  actual  value  of  5.909  for  1953.4.  Here  5.909  =  log 
360.3,  while  368.3  is  nominal  GNP  measured  in  billions  of 
dollars  (annual  rate,  seasonally  adjusted). 
magnitude  obtains  because  base  velocity  has grown 
enough  during  the  period  1954-85  that  no  growth 
in the  base would  have  permitted  a significant amount 
of inflation!i9  The  base  growth  rate  needed  to  yield 
zero  inflation-literally  to  yield  3  percent  nominal 
GNP  growth-with  model  (3) is Ab,  =  -0.0041  (i.e., 
about  - 1.6 percent  per  year).  With  that  rate  held  con- 
stant  for  128  periods,  the  RMSE  is about  3.6  per- 
cent  (see  line  4),  which  is only  about  twice  as large 
as with policy  rule (2). But it is important  to recognize 
that  the  correct  constant  value  of Ab,  embodied  in 
the  “rule”  of  line  4 could  not  have  been  known  ex 
ante,  before  the  experience  of  1954-85  had been  ac- 
cumulated,  for  it is calculated  on  the  basis  of model 
I9 That  this  is the  case  can  be  seen  from  the  model  reported 
in  equation  (3).  Setting  both  Ab,  and  e,  at  zero  for  all t yields 
Ax,  =  .00749  +  2.57  Ax,-,,  which  has  a steady-state  value  of 
.00749/(1-257)  =  .OlOO. Thus  with  zero  base  growth,  nominal 
GNP  would  grow  at  about  1 percent  per  quarter  or  4 percent 
per  year.  With  3 percent  per  year  real  GNP  growth,  we  would 
then  have  about  1 percent  per  year  inflation. 
(3).20  By  contrast,  our  preferred  rule  (2)  is  not 
based  on  any  parameter  estimated  in  the  model. 
In response  to the  last claim,  it could  be said that- 
while  not  precisely  based  on  model  (3)-the 
parameter  value  X2 =  0.25  in  rule  (2)  is  to  some 
extent  based  on  ex post  knowledge.  Consequently, 
it is of interest  to  know  how  rule  (2) would  perform 
with  different  values  used  for &--in  particular,  with 
X2 =  0.  Results  for  that  case,  which  corresponds  in 
spirit but not  in detail to the  rule proposed  by Meltzer 
(1984,  1987),  are  reported  in line  5.  There  we  see 
that  performance  is less good  than  in line  1, but  still 
rather  impressive.  Shifting  X2  in the  other  direction, 
to  a value  of  0.5,  yields  results  (not  tabulated)  that 
are even  better  than  in line  1. Also reported  in Table 
III is one  result pertaining  to the policy  rule (l),  which 
I had previously  proposed.  Specifically,  line 6 shows 
that  with  X1  =  0.02  the  RMSE  would  be  about 
*O Specifically,  by  solving  Ax  =  .00749  +  2.57  Ax  +  .487  Ab 
for  Ab  with  Ax  set  equal  to  .00739. 
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X1 =  0.05  would  result  in  explosive  fluctuations. 
Finally,  the  foregoing  RMSE  figures  can  be  com- 
pared  to those  that  actually  obtained  during  1954-85, 
i.e.,  with  actual  Federal  Reserve  policy.  Because  of 
the  substantial  amount  of inflation  that  occurred,  the 
RMSE  value  is enormous  in comparison-the  value 
is .77 11, over  30 times  as great  as in line  1. Perhaps 
more  interesting,  however,  is  the  extent  of  actual 
nominal  GNP  ~~riabi&~  about  its (inflationary)  trend 
path.  Consequently,  the  RMSE  value  for xt relative 
to a fitted  linear  trend  is also reported  in line  2. That 
value is 6.2 percent  per  period,  somewhat  higher  than 
in lines  5 and  6,  and  just  over  three  times  as great 
as  in  line  1.  Thus  the  first-column  indications  of 
Table  III  are  that  our  proposed  rule  would  not  only 
prevent  inflation  but  also  yield  less  variability  in 
nominal  GNP  growth  than  actual  Fed  policy. 
The  foregoing  estimates  are  all  predicated, 
however,  on  the  “model”  of GNP  behavior  given  in 
equation  (3). The  extreme  simplicity  of this specifica- 
tion  arguably  tends  neither  to  favor  nor  harm  the 
simulated  performance  of  our  rule  (2).  But  there  is 
one  aspect  of  specification  (3)  that  is questionable 
and  that  works  in our  favor-namely,  the  inclusion 
of the.current-period  value  of Ab,  as an explanatory 
variable.  To  some  extent  the  estimated  effects,  a 
critic  might  claim,  could  be  due  to the  sample-period 
response  of Ab, to  Axt,  rather  than  the  causal  direc- 
tion  presumed  in  (3).  Consequently,  results  are 
reported  in column  two  of Table  III for  simulations 
like  those  of column  one  except  that  the  “model”  is 
as  follows: 
(4)  Ax,  =  0.00506  +  0.199  Ax-1 
(0.0020)  (0.083) 
+  0.529  Ab,+  +  e, 
(0.127) 
R*  =  0.23  6  =  0.010  DW  =  2.05 
Here,  non,~  of the  current-period  connection  between 
Ab, and Ax, is attributed  to the  direction  going  from 
policy  to GNP.  This  specification  should  be expected 
to  sharply  deteriorate  the  rule’s  performance,  as  it 
introduces  a  full  two-quarter  lag  between  target 
departures  xZ1  -  x,-~ and  corrective  effects. 
Indeed,  as  inspection  of  Table  III  will  readily 
indicate,  the  performance  of rules  (2)  and  (1)  both 
deteriorate.  The  former  remains  superior,  never- 
theless,  to  any  of the  other  possibilities  considered, 
and  continues  to  yield  substantially  less  GNP 
variability  than  observed  in actual  U.S.  experience. 
Since  there  is probably  some  within-quarter  response 
Table III 
SIMULATION  RESULTS  FOR ALTERNATIVE  RULES 
Policy 
1.  Eq.(2),  XI  =  .25 
2.  Actual  historical 
3.  Ab, =  0 
4.  Ab,  =  -a0041 
5.  Eq.(2),  X1  =  0 
6.  Eq.(l),  X1 =  .02 
RMSE  RMSE 
Model  (3)  Model  (4) 
.0197  .0217 
.7711  .7711 
(.0616)*  (.0616)* 
.2258  .2302 
.0358  .0391 
.0499  .0502 
.0424  .0671 
*This  is RMSE  relative  to fitted  trend  rather  than  target  path. 
of  Ax,  to  Ab,  in  actuality,  this  brief  investigation 
suggests  results  intermediate  to those  of columns  one 
and  two.  For  rule  (‘Z), they  are  clearly  excellent. 
Criticisms 
At  this  point  it  will  be  useful  to  consider  some 
possible  objections  that  might  be  raised  by  critics. 
Three  that  will be  discussed  in turn  pertain  to  (i) the 
Lucas  critique,  (ii) the  natural-rate  hypothesis,  and 
(iii)  our  neglect  of  open-economy  considerations. 
With  respect  to  (i)  the  point  is,  of  course,  that  the. 
parameters  of our  models  (3)  and  (4)  might  change 
with  an  alteration  in  policy  from  that  actually  ex- 
perienced  to  that  of  the  hypothesized  rules.  Since 
these  “models”  are  not  structural,  this  objection  is 
in principle  correct.  I would  suggest,  however,  that 
the  Lucas  critique  is  much  more  important  quan- 
titatively  for  equations  relating  real  to  nominal 
variables-e.g.,  Phillips curves-than  for ones  relating 
nominal  demand  to  nominal  policy  variables.  If this 
conjecture  is  correct,  then  equations  (3)  and  (4:) 
should  be  virtually  immune  to  the  critique,  as it has 
been  found  to  be  rather  hard  to  detect  empirically 
even  in Phillips-curve  relations.  [See,  e.g.,  Gordon 
and  King  (1982).] 
Next,  there  is  the  issue  of  the  natural-rate 
hypothesis,  which  has  recently  come  under  attack 
as a result  of extremely  high and persistent  European 
unemployment  rates. 2’ But  in  the  context  of  the 
present  discussion,  the  issue  is not  whether  unem- 
ployment  promptly  reverts  following  a shock  to some 
“natural”  level,  but  whether  the  trend  growth  rate  of 
real  output  is essentially  independent  of  monetary 
2’  See, for example, Fitoussi and Phelps (1986)  and  Blanchard 
and  Summers  (1986). 
16  ECONOMIC REVIEW.  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1987 policy.  If  the  recent  experience  is  thought  to  pro- 
vide  evidence  against  this  relevant  proposition,  it is 
unclear  how  the  posited  relationship  would  go.  Pro- 
ponents  of the  notion  that  nominal  demand  behavior 
affects  the  trend  output  rate  usually  hypothesize  a 
positive  relationship,  i.e.,  that  real  output  growth  is 
stimulated  by more  rapid growth  of nominal  demand. 
But in fact nominal  GNP  growth  has been  mm  rapid 
in Europe  during  the  1970s  and  1980s  than  it was 
during  the  1950s  and  1960~,~~ yet  it  is  the  more 
recent  period  that  has  featured  high  unemployment 
and  reduced  real  growth. 
Finally,  let us briefly  address  the  issue  of how  our 
proposed  rule  should  be  modified  to  take  account 
of  open-economy  considerations,  i.e.,  large  import 
and  export  sectors.  In this  regard  the  relevant  prin- 
ciple  to  keep  in mind  is that  the  most  constructive 
thing  that  monetary  policy  can  accomplish  is  to 
induce  nominal  aggregate  demand  to grow  smoothly 
and at a noninflationary  rate.  Thus  the  only  modifica- 
tion  required  to our  rule  is the  possible  replacement 
of nominal  GNP  with some  other  measure  of nominal 
aggregate  demand.  My  first  inclination  would  be  to 
use  real  GNP  multiplied  by  the  consumer  price 
index.  But  the  main  point  is that  steady  growth  in 
some  such  aggregate  constitutes  a more  reasonable 
objective  for the  monetary  authority  than  either  main- 
taining a fixed  exchange  rate  or following  a target  path 
for  any  measure  of  the  money  stock.  These  are 
variables  that  are  neither  instruments  nor  ultimate 
22 For  Europe  as a whole,  nominal  GDP  grew  at an average  rate 
of  14 percent  over  the  period  1955-69  and  24.6  percent  over 
1969-83  (IMF,  International  Financial Statistics). 
targets.  While  the  same  is true  of nominal  aggregate 
demand,  it is a magnitude  that  is more  closely  related 
to output  and  inflation  variables-which  are ultimate 
targets. 
Conclusion 
Let  us now  conclude  with  a brief  summary  of the 
foregoing  argument.  The  paper  begins  by reiterating 
that  a policy  rule  can  be  activist;  the  distinction  be- 
tween  rules  and  discretion  depends  upon  the  stage 
at which  optimization  calculations  enter  the  policy 
process-in  the  design  of a formula  (rule)  to  be  im- 
plemented  each  period  or  in  each  period’s  (discre- 
tionary)  selection  of  a  policy  action.  Next,  the 
Kydland-Prescott  (1977)  example  is used  to illustrate 
the tendency  for discretionary  monetary  policy  to pro- 
duce  more  inflation  than  would  result  from  a rule, 
with  no  additional  employment  obtained  in compen- 
sation.  Then  a specific  monetary  rule  is proposed, 
one  that  sets  the  monetary  base-a  controllable 
instrument-each  period  in  a  manner  designed  to 
keep  nominal  aggregate  demand  growing  smoothly 
at  a noninflationary  rate.  Some  simple  simulations 
are conducted  which  suggest  that this rule would  have 
worked  well  in  the  United  States,  over  the  period 
1954-85,  if it  had  been  in effect.  The  basic  idea  is 
that,  since  economists  do  not  understand  how 
nominal  demand  changes  are divided  between  infla- 
tion  and  output  growth,  the  most  useful  thing  that 
monetary  policy  can  accomplish  is to  keep  nominal 
demand  growing  smoothly  at a noninflationary  rate. 
This  can  apparently  be  well  achieved  by  means  of 
a  rule  such  as  the  one  proposed. 
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